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PEEKING UNDER THE COVERS: TAKING A 
CLOSER LOOK AT PROSECUTORIAL 
DECISION-MAKING INVOLVING QUEER 
YOUTH AND STATUTORY RAPE 
Michael H. Meidinger* 
Abstract: Queer youth are in a precarious position. In comparison to their 
heterosexual peers, queer youth are disproportionately punished in the 
criminal justice system, and they may be more vulnerable to being prose-
cuted for statutory rape. They may be selectively prosecuted because 
prosecutors have broad discretion in whom they prosecute, and social 
norms favoring heterosexuals may be part of their decision-making proc-
ess. In light of the significant barriers before a statutory rape defendant al-
leging selective prosecution, especially for juvenile defendants, limited dis-
covery orders like the one at issue in Commonwealth v. Washington may be a 
pragmatic way to make equitable change. 
Introduction 
If it’s two boys and they’re both young or it’s two girls, there’s a tendency to as-
sume it’s abuse. [With] opposite genders they’re more likely to say “Well, you 
know, they’re experimenting.” 
—A juvenile defender1 
 Statutory rape laws vary by state and complications arise when the 
sexual activity occurs between a juvenile and a person who is close in 
age but has already reached majority.2 Prosecutors have discretion in 
prosecuting statutory rape cases and their decisions often depend on 
several factors such as the age of consent, whether the sexual activity 
resulted in pregnancy, the age gap between the parties, and whether 
 
* Executive Comments Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice 
(2011–2012). 
1 Katayoon Majd et al., Hidden Injustice: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Trans-
gender Youth in Juvenile Courts 62 (2009), available at http://www.equityproject.org/ 
pdfs/hidden_injustice.pdf (citing Interview by Equity Project with a juvenile defender 
( Jul. 17, 2007)). 
2 See Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of 
Teenage Sexualities, 9 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 313, 314–15 (2003). 
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the parties are of the opposite sex.3 The parties’ sex may invite scrutiny 
when, for example, a state legislatively carves out a “Romeo and Juliet” 
exception.4 This exception precludes prosecution of parties engaging 
in proscribed sexual activity if they are close enough in age, as defined 
by the statute.5 Although this exception may be gender-neutral, some 
Romeo and Juliet exceptions discriminate against non-heterosexual 
(“queer youth”) because they exempt only opposite-sex sexual activity.6 
For this reason, the heterosexual or homosexual nature of the activity 
may factor into a decision to prosecute.7 These discriminatory Romeo 
and Juliet exceptions place queer youth at a greater risk for statutory 
rape prosecution.8 
 Even in states without these discriminatory exceptions, prosecutors 
may still consider sexual orientation when prosecuting.9 In Common-
wealth v. Washington W., a Massachusetts case, two boys under the age of 
seventeen allegedly had an ongoing sexual relationship.10 When the 
younger boy’s father discovered the relationship, he reported it to the 
police.11 The prosecution subsequently charged the older boy, Wash-
ington, with two counts of statutory rape and two delinquency com-
plaints of indecent assault and battery.12 Although Massachusetts has 
no Romeo and Juliet exception, Washington argued that the district 
attorney selectively prosecuted him because of his sexual orientation.13 
Therefore, the trial court granted a limited discovery order compelling 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statu-
tory Rape, 48 Buff. L. Rev. 703, 734 (2000); Sutherland, supra note 2, at 314–15, 326–27 
(“[W]here the age gap between the parties is narrow, charges for violations of age of con-
sent laws are much more likely to be filed when the partners are of the same sex.”). 
4 Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious Discrimi-
nation Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195, 198 (2008). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 226–27. 
7 See id. 
8 See Higdon, supra note 4, at 226–29; Sutherland, supra note 2, at 326–28; see also Bar-
bara L. Frankowski et al., American Academy of Pediatrics, Clinical Report: Sexual Orientation 
and Adolescents, 113 Pediatrics 1827, 1828 (2004). 
9 See Sutherland, supra note 2, at 326–28; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Washington W., 
928 N.E.2d 908, 911–12 (Mass. 2010) (seeking discovery to prove selective statutory rape 
prosecution based on sexual orientation). 
10 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 910. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See id.; Legislative Alert: H 445: An Act Relative to the Protection of Children, Citizens for 
Juv. Just. (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.cfjj.org/pdf/Romeo%20and%20Juliet%20Leg%20 
Alert%203.29.11.pdf. In 2011, Massachusetts Representative Kay Khan sponsored a bill to 
add a Romeo and Juliet exception to Massachusetts statutory rape law. Legislative Alert: H 
445: An Act Relative to the Protection of Children, supra. 
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the district attorney’s office to produce statistical data regarding the 
prosecution of statutory rape and indecent assault and battery in cases 
involving similarly aged teenagers of the opposite sex.14 As Washington 
argued, even in states where discriminatory Romeo and Juliet excep-
tions do not exist, sexual orientation may be a factor in prosecutorial 
decision-making.15 
 Any defendant alleging selective prosecution faces several barri-
ers.16 In United States v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant must first make a threshold showing of selective prosecution 
before a court will grant discovery.17 To meet this threshold, defen-
dants must demonstrate that prosecutors targeted them while ignoring 
other similarly situated individuals.18 The Court imposed this barrier to 
discovery for policy concerns, such as facilitating law enforcement and 
reducing the attorney general’s encroachment into Executive terri-
tory.19 Prosecutors retain broad discretion in choosing their defendants 
and, even if a defendant reaches the threshold necessary for discovery, 
Armstrong remains an arguably insurmountable barrier.20 Absent clear 
evidence to the contrary, prosecutorial decision is presumed proper.21 
 In juvenile cases, the confidentiality of juvenile court records cre-
ates another barrier to the threshold showing of relevance sufficient to 
warrant discovery.22 While adult defendants may access records of simi-
                                                                                                                      
 
14 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 910. 
15 See id.; Higdon, supra note 4, at 227–29; Sutherland, supra note 2, at 322; see also Kay 
L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory 
Rape Caseload, 55 Emory L.J. 691, 694–95, 739 n.176 (2006); Joseph J. Wardenski, Com-
ment, A Minor Exception?: The Impact of Lawrence v. Texas on LGBT Youth, 95 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 1363, 1367–68 (2005). 
16 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465–66 (1996). 
17 See id. at 458, 463–64. 
18 See id. at 465. 
19 See id. The attorney general is an executive branch official. See id. at 464. 
20 See id. at 464 (stating “that the showing necessary to obtain discovery should itself be 
a significant barrier”); Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based 
Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 Harvard Blackletter L.J. 127, 
141–42, 176 (2003) (arguing that the intent requirement of a selective prosecution claim is 
an “insurmountable obstacle”); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the Feder-
alization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1309, 1322–23 (1997) (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464) (arguing that the 
“‘significant barrier’” erected by Armstrong “has effectively mooted an important constitu-
tional protection”). 
21 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464. 
22 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 912 (noting that no public records are available for 
Washington to show that he was treated differently by the prosecutor and that there are 
strong policy reasons for such suppression); see also Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to 
Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 Yale L. & Pol’y 
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larly situated adults, juvenile defendants may not access records of simi-
larly situated juveniles due to privacy concerns.23 Because of this lack of 
access, a defendant like Washington faces an especially significant ob-
stacle in proving selective prosecution.24 
 Another barrier that defendants like Washington face is a lack of 
legal protection for sexual orientation.25 America has not yet found an 
equal place for queers in its legal system.26 This is evidenced in part by 
the patchwork of rights for queer Americans—notably, a lack of equal 
recognition for same-sex relationships.27 This barrier means that queer 
youth charged with sexual misconduct face negative social attitudes and 
community norms, as embedded in prosecutorial decision-making.28 
Therefore, the novelty of legally recognized same-sex relationships will 
likely remain a barrier for queer youth arguing selective prosecution 
until the recognition of such relationships is commonplace.29 
                                                                                                                      
Rev. 155, 155 (1999); William McHenry Horne, Note, The Movement to Open Juvenile Courts: 
Realizing the Significance of Public Discourse in First Amendment Analysis, 39 Ind. L. Rev. 659, 
659–60 (2006). 
23 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 914 (“An adult defendant could search court re-
cords to determine, from complaints and indictments, the number of prosecutions that 
have been instituted . . . .”); Bazelon, supra note 22, at 155. 
24 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 914; Bazelon, supra note 22, at 155; Horne, supra 
note 22 at 659–60. 
25 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 911 (“Massachusetts courts do not recognize sexual 
orientation as a protected class.”); Higdon, supra note 4, at 224; Edward Stein, Evaluating 
the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 471, 482–83 
(2001); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 756 (2011). “Lau-
ren Berlant and Michael Warner define heteronormativity as ‘the institutions, structures of 
understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coher-
ent—that is, organised as a sexuality—but also privileged.’” Robert S. Chang & Adrienne 
D. Davis, Making Up Is Hard to Do: Race/Gender/Sexual Orientation in the Law School Classroom, 
33 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1, 15 n.30 (2010) (quoting Lauren Berlant & Michael Warner, Sex 
in Public, 24 Critical Inquiry 547, 548 n.2 (1998)). Sexual orientation is reviewed under 
a lower, rational basis standard—unlike classifications such as race. Yoshino, supra, at 756. 
“The few courts that have held that sexual orientation classifications warrant heightened 
scrutiny have had their decisions overruled or vacated.” Stein, supra, at 482. 
26 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 2; Higdon, supra note 4, at 214; Stein, supra note 25, 
at 482–83; Yoshino, supra note 25, at 756. 
27 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1949–50 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence v. Texas has 
yet to result in equal relationship recognition for same-sex couples); Marriage Equality & 
Other Relationship Recognition Laws, Hum. Rts. Campaign, ( Jul. 6, 2011), http://www.hrc. 
org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf [hereinafter HRC Marriage Equal-
ity Laws]. 
28 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463–65; Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 912; Levine, supra 
note 15, at 694–95, 721–23, 739 n.176; Wardenski, supra note 15, at 1367–68. 
29 See Levine, supra note 15, at 739 n.176; Tribe, supra note 27, at 1949–50; Wardenski, 
supra note 15, at 1367–68. 
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 This Note argues that discovery requests, like the one affirmed in 
Washington W., may be a means to achieve equitable change in the se-
lective prosecution of queer youth.30 Part I explains statutory rape laws 
as applied to teenagers who engage in proscribed sexual activity and 
highlights some factors in the prosecutorial calculus. Part II discusses 
historical and recurring attitudes toward queers, emphasizing states’ 
hesitance to equally recognize same-sex adult relationships. Part II also 
explains that, in light of the challenges queer adults still face, queer 
youth are disadvantaged and are in a precarious legal position. Part III 
reviews selective prosecution requirements post-Armstrong, and finally, 
Part IV argues how queer youth may achieve favorable results within 
the existing framework through discovery requests. 
I. Which Teenagers Are Prosecuted for Their Sexual Activity? 
 A significant number of American teenagers are sexually active.31 
One study states that seventy percent of all teenagers in the United 
States have had sex by age nineteen.32 Another study involving adoles-
cents around age fourteen found that approximately twenty percent 
had already had oral sex, and over thirty percent said they intended to 
have oral sex within the next six months.33 Neither sexual intercourse 
nor oral sex is required to violate the law in most states.34 Laws pro-
scribing sexual activity with minors under the age of consent are often 
written broadly to ensnare a range of sexual contact, including non-
forcible contact that the participants may think is innocent.35 Conse-
quently, illegal sexual activity between teenagers, though difficult to 
precisely quantify, is widespread.36 
                                                                                                                      
 
30 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 915–16; Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 1071, 1090–92 (1997). 
31 See Facts on American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health, Guttmacher Inst., 1 
(Dec., 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.pdf. 
32 Id. 
33 Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher et al., Oral Versus Vaginal Sex Among Adolescents: Perceptions, 
Attitudes, and Behavior, 115 Pediatrics 845, 846–47 (2005). The median age of the sample 
in the study was 14.54 years old. See id. at 846. 
34 See Oberman, supra note 3, at 707; see, e.g., In re Pima Cnty. Juvenile Appeal No. 
74802-2, 790 P.2d 723, 724–25 (Ariz. 1990) (affirming conviction of sixteen-year-old male 
for consensual touching of fourteen-year-old girl’s breasts). 
35 See Oberman, supra note 3, at 707; see, e.g., Pima Cnty. Juvenile Appeal, 790 P.2d at 730. 
36 See Halpern-Felsher et al., supra note 33, at 845; Oberman, supra note 3, at 704 n.3; 
Facts on Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health, supra note 31. Professor Michelle Oberman 
points out that, based on estimates of U.S. Census data available in 2000, there were 15 
million American residents ages thirteen to sixteen and, even estimating conservatively, 
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 The age combinations that constitute proscribed sexual activity 
vary by state.37 Some states forbid sexual contact between a legal adult 
who is eighteen or older and a minor under sixteen.38 Other states fol-
low the Model Penal Code and forbid sexual activity between parties 
who are beyond a specified age gap, such as when the parties are more 
than four years apart.39 Others have blanket prohibitions forbidding 
sexual contact with children under a certain age but mitigate the of-
fense’s severity if the parties are within a specified age gap.40 Despite 
these state-by-state variations, prosecutorial discretion remains con-
stant.41 It is impossible for prosecutors to charge every teenager who 
violates statutory rape laws.42 Therefore, prosecutors must inevitably 
choose their defendants and considering which teenagers are prose-
cuted reveals not only state policies but prosecutorial motives.43 
 Professor Michelle Oberman categorizes contemporary prosecu-
tion of statutory rape cases into three groups—cases involving preg-
nancy, cases that are easily identifiable, and cases perceived as “sick.”44 
First, prosecutors pursue cases resulting in pregnancy because single 
teenage mothers often cost the government more money.45 Second, 
prosecutors pursue easily-identifiable cases that are reported by health-
care providers, state agencies, and other mandated reporters when mi-
nors use their services.46 The state has an interest in pursuing these 
cases, not only because of similar concerns about governmental finan-
cial support, but because there is a need to protect children.47 In this 
situation, the state exercises its ability to shield children from harmful 
sexual activity and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).48 Finally, 
prosecutors pursue “sick” cases that involve either a significant age gap 
or exploitation, such as when there is a notable power differential be-
                                                                                                                      
there are over 7.5 million annual incidents of statutory rape. See Oberman, supra note 3, at 
704 n.3. Moreover, these estimated incidents do not capture other statutorily proscribed 
sexual activity. See id. 
37 See Oberman, supra note 3, at 768–69. 
38 See id. at 768. 
39 See Model Penal Code § 213.3(1)(a) (1980); Oberman, supra note 3, at 769. 
40 See Oberman, supra note 3, at 769. 
41 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–65 (1996); Commonwealth v. 
Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908, 911 (Mass. 2010). 
42 Oberman, supra note 3, at 704. 
43 Levine, supra note 15, at 692; Oberman, supra note 3, at 733. 
44 Oberman, supra note 3, at 733. 
45 See id. at 734–35. 
46 See id. at 733, 739-41. 
47 See id. at 710, 739–40. 
48 See id. at 730–31, 752. 
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tween parties.49 At least one other scholar, however, characterizes this 
third category as the selective prosecution of “unpopular men,” such as 
older men or men of color who have sex with underage girls.50 
 Prosecutors may also choose to pursue a case between teenagers 
depending not on Oberman’s proffered factors, but on whether they 
see the relationship as among peers or as predatory.51 A peer relation-
ship is one where sexual activity generally occurs after the parties have 
been together for an appreciable amount of time.52 Prosecutors, how-
ever, assess more than the parties’ prior relationship, and a study by 
Professor Kay Levine found that their discretion relied on “signs of 
commitment, family support, and marriage potential.”53 Intimate rela-
tionships with these characteristics are not predatory and are therefore 
more likely to receive lenity from prosecutors, a practice known as an 
“intimacy discount.”54 Queer youth, however, may have more difficulty 
achieving familial support, and local legislatures may deny them the 
right of marriage.55 Thus, unlike their heterosexual peers, queer youth 
may not be afforded an intimacy discount.56 
II. Emerging Queer Youth and the Maltreatment They Receive 
 Queer youth are acknowledging their sexuality earlier than before 
and this poses unique legal challenges as they develop.57 Foundation-
ally, queer youth must confront the legacy of anti-queer sentiments and 
laws that do not treat same-sex relationships equally.58 Beyond these 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Oberman, supra note 3, at 743–44. Oberman notes that cases involving a young 
person and an older person in a position of power or trust, such as those between a stu-
dent and her or his teacher, are likely to be prosecuted in part because the adults are ex-
ploiting their relationships with the young persons. See id. 
50 See Michelle Oberman & Richard Delgado, Statutory Rape Laws: Does It Make Sense to 
Enforce Them in an Increasingly Permissive Society?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 86, 87. 
51 See Levine, supra note 15, at 694. 
52 See id. at 721–22. 
53 Id. at 694–95, 706–08. 
54 See id. at 694–95, 701, 724 n.127. 
55 See id. at 739 n.176. 
56 See Levine, supra note 15, at 694–95, 739 n.176. 
57 See Frankowski et al., supra note 8, at 1828; Arthur S. Leonard, Lawrence v. Texas and 
the New Law of Gay Rights, 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 189, 189–190 (2004); John Cloud, The 
Battle Over Gay Teens, Time, Oct. 10, 2005, at 42, 44. 
58 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); Edward L. Tulin, Note, Where Every-
thing Old Is New Again—Enduring Episodic Discrimination Against Homosexual Persons, 84 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1587, 1587, 1629 (2006) (explaining that even post-Lawrence, homosexuals are still 
perceived as criminals and remain targets of discriminatory state laws); Wardenski, supra 
note 15, at 1367–68 (arguing that queer youth are still stigmatized as criminals because of 
their sexuality). 
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handicaps, queer youth must also contend with the possibility of selec-
tive prosecution for sex-based crimes like statutory rape.59 
A. Bedrock of Discrimination 
 It is instructive to look at queer youth today through the historical 
lens of recurring animosity toward homosexuals in America, and even a 
cursory review shows that they do not start with a clean slate.60 The 
term “homosexual” emerged in the late nineteenth century with a de-
rogatory connotation.61 Society considered homosexuality a disgusting 
disease, a sign of evolutional inferiority, a threat to national security, 
and even animalistic.62 Homosexuals have battled with a presumption 
of being child molesters, unfit parents, and a threat to the American 
way of life.63 They have, throughout American history, endured degra-
dation, humiliation, physical torture, and deadly violence.64 
 Yet homophobia and anti-gay sentiments such as these do not 
dwell in the past; they manifest themselves in the present.65 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 3; Levine, supra note 15, at 694–95, 739 n.176; Suth-
erland, supra note 2, at 327. 
60 See Tulin, supra note 58, at 1587, 1629; Wardenski, supra note 15, at 1367–68. 
61 See Tulin, supra note 58, at 1591. 
62 See id. at 1590–92, 1594, 1597–98; S.E. Cupp, Conservatives, I’m Begging You: Leave 
Animals Out of Your Gay Marriage Talking Points, N.Y. Daily News, (Mar. 16, 2010, 3:15 PM) 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/conservatives-begging-leave-animals-gay-marriage-
talking-points-article-1.177608. 
63 See Tulin, supra note 58, at 1594, 1622; Wardenski, supra note 15, at 1375. 
64Our Story, Matthew Shepard Found., http://www.matthewshepard.org/our-story (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2012); Victims—Hate Crime Statistics, 2009, Fed. Bureau Investigation Crim. 
Just. Info. Services Division. Of the 8336 hate crimes recorded by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in 2009, 1482 were committed based on sexual orientation. Victims—Hate Crime 
Statistics, 2009, supra. There are lawmakers, however, who dispute the relationship between 
some hate crimes and sexual orientation. See Ryan Grim, Virginia Foxx: Story of Matthew 
Shepard’s Murder a “Hoax,” Huffington Post (May 30, 2009, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffing- 
tonpost.com/2009/04/29/virginia-foxx-story-of-ma_n_192971.html. For instance, during 
debates in the U.S. House of Representatives regarding a bill for expansion of federal hate 
crimes legislation, Representative Virginia Foxx of North Carolina maintained that Matthew 
Shepard, the young gay man for whom the bill was partially named, was not the victim of a 
hate crime. See id. Instead, Representative Foxx claimed that Shepard’s murder occurred 
after his assailants robbed him. Id. The hate crime aspect of the story, she said, was “a hoax 
that continues to be used as an excuse for passing these bills.” Id. According to police investi-
gators, local prosecutors, and the New York Times, however, Matthew Shepard’s story is not a 
hoax. See id. Two men—claiming to be gay—lured Matthew from a bar, tied him to a fence, 
physically tortured him, and left him to die. Id. Despite critics such as Representative Foxx, 
President Obama signed into law the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Pre-
vention Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835, 2835–44 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 249, 28 U.S.C. § 994, and 42 U.S.C. § 3716 (2010)). 
65 See Tulin, supra note 58, at 1587. 
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many of these perceptions are plainly visible in twenty-first century 
American culture.66 Even if attitudes toward gay people are improving, 
the recurring rejection of homosexuals indicates that queer youth con-
tinue to confront these not-so-past perceptions.67 
B. Lack of Legal Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships 
 Despite confronting ongoing societal hostility, queer Americans 
hoped for improved legal protection after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas.68 In Lawrence, a judge levied a two 
hundred dollar fine on each of two adult men—John Geddes Lawrence 
and Tyron Garner—for having consensual anal sex within the privacy 
of the home after police entered the residence looking for weapons, 
but instead arresting them for the Class C misdemeanor.69 After years 
of litigation, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and held un-
constitutional a Texas statute criminalizing intimate sexual conduct be-
                                                                                                                      
66 See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 
79, 81, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding unconstitutional a Florida law prohibiting ho-
mosexuals from adopting); Tulin, supra note 58, at 1603–04 (arguing that modern ways of 
depicting homosexuals are “strikingly similar” to past understandings, such as “the Progres-
sive-Era paradigm of homosexuality as a threat to the American family unit” and the modern 
version of the “Cold War-Era paradigm of homosexuality as a threat to American national 
security”); Cupp, supra note 62 (urging politicians to avoid conflating gay marriage with bes-
tiality); Brian Braiker, Grocery Store Un-Censors Elton John’s Baby Picture, ABC News ( Jan. 26, 
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/grocery-store-censors-elton-johns-baby-picture- 
with-shield/story?id=12770479 (reporting on Harps Food Stores, a grocer that used a “fam-
ily shield” —usually used to cover pornographic material—to cover a picture of Elton John, 
his male partner, and their baby); Andrew Harmon, Arnold Signs Bill Aiding Gay Youths, Ad-
vocate.com (Oct. 1, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/ 
2010/10/01/Schwarzenegger_Signs_Bill_Aiding_Gay_Youth (reporting on Governor Schwarz- 
enegger’s signing of several bills pertaining to queer youth and adults, including a bill that 
allows access to mental health services as a response to a wave of gay youth suicides and a 
repeal of a 1950s law calling for research into the causes of homosexuality and its cures). 
67 See Tulin, supra note 58, at 1587; Wardenski, supra note 15, at 1367–68. Gerald Unks 
argues that “[h]omosexuals are arguably the most hated group of people in the United 
States.” Gerald Unks, Thinking About the Gay Teen, in The Gay Teen: Educational Prac-
tice and Theory for Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adolescents 3 (Gerald Unks ed., 
1995). Unks explains that it is now socially unacceptable to deride people based on classi-
fications such as race, gender, or religion, and that minorities such as these “have gained a 
modicum of protection and acceptance.” Id. He points out that “words such as ‘nigger,’ 
‘kike,’ ‘gook,’ or ‘wop’” are unacceptable but that “‘faggot,’ ‘fairy,’ ‘homo,’ and ‘queer’ are 
used by many without hesitation.” Id. 
68 See 539 U.S. 558, 562–63 (2003); Wardenski, supra note 15, at 1365. 
69 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558, 562–64; Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. 
App. 2001), rev’d, 539 U.S. 558. 
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tween two people of the same sex in the privacy of a home.70 Memora-
bly, Justice Kennedy concluded his opinion stating that “times can blind 
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Con-
stitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles 
in their own search for greater freedom.”71 Yet, despite this stirring clo-
sure, gay rights advocates must toil for equal protection under the law 
because Lawrence has not borne its anticipated fruit.72 Lawrence’s 
strength will depend on its progeny and it is unclear whether courts will 
use it to validate more favorable rulings for gay rights.73 
 For instance, the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to apply the 
Lawrence decision to gay marriage after the state denied Harold Stand-
hardt and Tod Keltner a marriage license.74 Standhardt and Keltner, a 
gay couple living in Arizona, had been in a committed relationship 
and, three days after Lawrence, a local official denied their request for a 
marriage license because Arizona had a statutory prohibition against 
same-sex marriages.75 The couple sued, arguing that such a prohibition 
was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Law-
rence and Loving v. Virginia.76 In Loving, the Court held that a Virginia 
statute prohibiting interracial marriage violated the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.77 Loving es-
tablished marriage as a fundamental right, explaining that “[m]arriage 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563, 578–79. The Texas statute at issue defined “deviate sex-
ual intercourse” as “(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the 
mouth or anus of another person” or “(B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of 
another person with an object.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.01(a) (2009). The Lawrence 
Court did not say that the couple had a fundamental right to engage in their intimate 
sexual conduct but instead decided the case solely on their due process argument, explain-
ing that private sex is within the “‘realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter.’” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 847 (1992)). 
71 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. 
72 See Leonard, supra note 57, at 189–90; Tribe, supra note 27, at 1949–50; Tulin, supra 
note 58, at 1587. 
73 See Leonard, supra note 57, at 189–90; Tribe, supra note 27, at 1945, 1949–50; War-
denski, supra note 15, at 1391–94. 
74 See Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 456 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). Justice 
Kennedy’s decision in Lawrence was carefully tailored to avoid formally recognizing homo-
sexual relationships. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. In stating that Lawrence did “not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosex-
ual persons seek to enter,” Justice Kennedy effectively tethered Lawrence’s reach. See id.; 
Leonard, supra note 57, at 189; Tribe, supra note 27, at 1945, 1949–50. 
75 See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 453–54. 
76 See id. at 454, 458. 
77 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
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is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very exis-
tence and survival.”78 Standhardt and Keltner argued that, in light of 
Lawrence and Loving, the state’s refusal to marry them violated the right 
to marry and equal protection rights under federal and state constitu-
tions.79 The Arizona court disagreed, stating that they each have a fun-
damental right to marry but “[they] do not have a right to marry each 
other.”80 This legacy continues because, despite a small minority, most 
states do not legally recognize same-sex relationships in marriage.81 
C. Queer Youth’s Precarious Position in Modern America 
 Queer youth may risk disproportionate punishment for their sexual 
encounters because social norms that do not include same-sex relation-
ships factor into prosecutorial decision-making.82 This is complicated by 
the fact that more queer youth are acknowledging their sexual orienta-
tion at an earlier age.83 According to the American Academy of Pediat-
rics, sexual orientation is likely established during early childhood and 
                                                                                                                      
78 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
79 See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 454, 458. 
80 Id. at 464–65. Notably, however, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court also did not expressly conclude that there was a funda-
mental right for people of the same sex to marry each other but nonetheless held that 
precluding such marriages did “not survive rational basis review . . . .” 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 
(Mass. 2003). Goodridge is arguably part of Lawrence’s trickle down effect. See id. at 948, 961. 
Similar efforts to achieve marriage equality in other states, however, have failed. See, e.g., 
Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 863, 868 n.3 (8th Cir. 2006); Hernandez 
v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (construing Lawrence as addressing “intimate, pri-
vate activity” and not the “state-conferred benefit” of marriage), abrogated by N.Y. Dom. 
Rel. Law § 10-a (McKinney 2011). Compare Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 
2009) (holding Iowa statute limiting marriage to a man and a woman was unconstitu-
tional), with A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 
2010, at A1 (explaining “[a]n unprecedented vote to remove three Iowa Supreme Court 
justices who were part of the unanimous decision that legalized same-sex marriage . . .” in 
Iowa). New York’s legislature disagreed with the outcome of Hernandez v. Robles and abro-
gated it by passing N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 10-a, which expressly permits same-sex 
marriage. § 10-a. 
81 See HRC Marriage Equality Laws, supra note 27. 
82 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 1–3; Chang & Davis, supra note 25, at 15 n.30 (citing 
Berlant & Warner, supra note 25, at 548 n.2); Levine, supra note 15, at 694–95; Wardenski, 
supra note 15, at 1367–68, 1374–75. 
83 See Frankowski et al., supra note 8, at 1827–28; Leonard, supra note 57, at 189–90; 
Cloud, supra note 57, at 44; Caitlin Ryan, Supportive Families, Healthy Children: Helping Fami-
lies with Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Children, Fam. Acceptance Project, 1 (2009), 
http://familyproject.sfsu.edu/files/English_Final_Print_Version_Last.pdf. 
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young people are becoming aware of their sexuality earlier than was 
previously common.84 
1. Discriminatory Romeo and Juliet Exception 
 Discriminatory Romeo and Juliet exceptions conditioned on oppo-
site-sex parties may unfairly ensnare queer youth.85 In Texas, for exam-
ple, sexual contact with a child under the age of seventeen is felonious, 
but an affirmative defense exists if the actors are no more than three 
years apart and the victim is “of the opposite sex.”86 This exception is 
therefore unavailable to teens engaging in same-sex sexual contact.87 
 Similarly, Alabama bestows an advantage on heterosexual sex.88 
Although rape in the second degree is narrowly defined in Alabama as 
“sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex,” the state’s sod-
omy law captures homosexual sex, termed “deviate sexual inter-
course.”89 Unlike its rape statute, however, Alabama does not reduce 
the penalty for parties charged with sodomy who are less than two years 
apart in age.90 Thus, as in Texas, youth in Alabama who engage in ho-
mosexual sex could be subject to harsher punishment than similarly 
situated heterosexual teens.91 
                                                                                                                      
84 See Frankowski et al., supra note 8, at 1827–28. One study “found that the average 
age that youth realized they were gay was a little over age 13.” Ryan, supra note 83, at 1. It is 
difficult to quantify the number of homosexuals in America because fear of homosexuality 
in respondents hinders the accuracy of the data. See Frankowski et al., supra note 8, at 
1828. The Academy of Pediatrics also explains that human sexuality likely exists on a con-
tinuum, noting that many adults who identify as heterosexual report having had sexual 
encounters with members of the same sex when they were adolescents. See id. Therefore, 
sexual orientation, sexual activity, and laws policing the sexual activity of teens and minors 
may affect teens of varying sexual identities, regardless of the number of people who actu-
ally identify as homosexual. See id. 
85 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(b)(1) (2011); Oberman, supra note 3, at 733. 
86 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1), (b)(1), (d). The statute also requires that the 
actor did not use such coercive methods as duress, force, or threats; was not required to 
register as a sex offender at the time of the offense; and did not have another conviction 
under the statute. See id. § 21.11(b)(2)–(3). 
87 See id. § 21.11(b)(1). 
88 Compare Ala. Code § 13A-6-62(a)(1) (2011) (providing an exculpatory age-based 
exception for sexual intercourse between members of the opposite sex), with id. § 13A-6-
64(a)(1) (providing no exculpatory age-based exception for sodomy). 
89 Id. §§ 13A-6-60, 13A-6-62(a)(1), 13A-6-63(a)(1). The applicable age range is less 
than sixteen but more than twelve years old. Id. § 13A-6-64(a)(1). Deviate sexual inter-
course is defined as “[a]ny act of sexual gratification between persons not married to each 
other involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.” Id. § 13A-
6-60(2). 
90 See id. §§ 13A-6-62(a)(1), 13A-6-64(a)(1). 
91 See id.; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(b)(1). 
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 California also treats heterosexual sex more leniently through sub-
tle differences between statutory rape and sodomy laws.92 While it is 
felonious for “[a]ny person” to engage in “unlawful sexual intercourse 
with a minor,” the crime is reduced to a misdemeanor if the actors are 
within three years of age.93 It is also unlawful for “any person” to en-
gage in sodomy with someone under the age of eighteen, but no simi-
lar gradation of offense exists based on the actors’ age difference.94 
Although heterosexual teens may engage in sodomy as defined by the 
statute, penile-anal contact is more commonly characteristic of homo-
sexual male sex.95 Therefore, queer teens in California may suffer a 
harsher penalty for their sexual conduct.96 Moreover, in Texas and Ala-
bama, exculpatory exceptions are made for otherwise illegal sexual 
contact if the actors are legal spouses—a status which same-sex partners 
are not granted.97 
 The Kansas case of State v. Limon demonstrates the irreparable 
harm that queer youth may face as a result of these discriminatory stat-
utes.98 Matthew Limon had oral sex with M.A.R., the male complainant, 
                                                                                                                      
92 See Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(a) (2011) (defining unlawful sexual intercourse as “an 
act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpe-
trator, if the person is a minor”). Compare id. § 261.5(b)–(c) (reducing unlawful sexual 
intercourse from felony to misdemeanor if actors are not more than three years apart in 
age), with id. § 286(b)(1) (specifying punishment for sodomy with another person under 
the age of eighteen). 
93 See id. § 261.5(a)–(c). 
94 See id. § 286(b)(1). The statute provides that “any person who participates in an act 
of sodomy with another person who is under 18 years of age shall be punished by impris-
onment in the state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year.” Id. Sodomy in 
California is “sexual conduct consisting of contact between the penis of one person and 
the anus of another person.” Id. § 286(a). 
95 See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sod-
omy Laws, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 103, 111 (2000). Professor Christopher Leslie argues 
that sodomy laws turn homosexuals into a “criminal class.” Id. at 103, 111. 
96 See id. Compare Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(b)–(c), with id. § 286(b)(1). 
97 See Ala. Code § 13A-6-60(3) (2011) (excluding married parties from definition of 
sexual contact); Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(a) (defining unlawful sexual intercourse as “an 
act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpe-
trator, if the person is a minor”); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(b-1) (2011) (providing 
that “[i]t is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the actor was the 
spouse of the child at the time of the offense”); see also HRC Marriage Equality Laws, supra 
note 27. Neither Texas nor Alabama offers any relationship recognition for same-sex cou-
ples, and California offers limited recognition but not marriage. See HRC Marriage Equality 
Laws, supra note 27. 
98 See State v. Limon (Limon I ), 83 P.3d 229, 232 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 122 P.3d 
22 (Kan. 2005). 
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when the boys were approximately three years apart in age.99 Limon 
was convicted of criminal sodomy and, because Limon and M.A.R. were 
both male, he was subject to disparate treatment “based upon the ho-
mosexual nature of [his] conduct.”100 The court sentenced Limon to 
over seventeen years in prison and, upon his release, he faced up to five 
years of supervision and registration as a persistent sex offender.101 Had 
Limon been able to avail himself of the Kansas Romeo and Juliet provi-
sion, his sentence would have been drastically reduced.102 
 Limon appealed his initial sentence but the Kansas Court of Ap-
peals affirmed and denied further review.103 The Supreme Court, after 
deciding Lawrence, granted Limon’s petition for certiorari and vacated 
the Kansas Court of Appeals’ judgment as deserving “further consid-
eration in light of Lawrence . . . .”104 This nudge by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, however, did not move the Kansas court.105 Even though the 
court recognized the starkly different fate awaiting teenagers like Li-
mon, it upheld the discriminatory Romeo and Juliet provision.106 The 
court explained that Lawrence applied only to adults, and that the legis-
lature could “punish those adults who engage in heterosexual sodomy 
with a child less severely than those adults who engage in homosexual 
sodomy with a child.”107 The court affirmed Limon’s lengthy sentence 
and required sex-offender registration, holding that disparate treat-
ment of homosexual sexual activity is in the state’s interest.108 
                                                                                                                      
99 See State v. Limon (Limon II ), 122 P.3d 22, 24 (Kan. 2005); Limon I, 83 P.3d at 232–
33. The boys had oral sex shortly after Limon had turned eighteen, one month before 
M.A.R. turned fifteen. See Limon II, 122 P.3d at 24. 
100 Limon II, 122 P.3d at 24. 
101 See id. at 25. “Sodomy” can include both oral and anal sexual contact. See Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-5501(b) (2011) (defining sodomy in part as “oral contact or oral penetration of 
the female genitalia or oral contact of the male genitalia; anal penetration, however slight, 
of a male or female by any body part or object”). Id. Professor Michael Higdon warns that 
Romeo and Juliet provisions such as these “should immediately inspire caution given that 
they require individuals who are not even adults to register as a sex offender.” Higdon, 
supra note 4, at 250. He also points out the potential for serious complications from the 
required public disclosure component of sex offender registration because queer youth 
may be closeted. See id. at 250–51. In addition to being labeled a sex offender and having 
their secret identities thrust into the public, outing queer youth in this way could increase 
the risk that they will commit suicide. See id. 
102 See Limon II, 122 P.3d at 25. 
103 See id. 
104 Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955, 955 (2003) (mem.). 
105 See Limon I, 83 P.3d at 232. 
106 See Limon I, 83 P.3d at 237–38 (holding in part that Limon failed to show that his 
sentence was “unconstitutionally disproportionate”). 
107 See id. at 235. 
108 See id. at 237. 
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 The court credited four interests on which the state could ration-
ally rely in punishing criminal homosexual sodomy with a sentence al-
most fourteen-times longer than that for criminal heterosexual sod-
omy.109 First, the court credited protecting children from consensual 
homosexual sex as a rational interest, as homosexual sex is contrary to 
traditional sexual norms.110 Second, the court mentioned the state’s 
preference for marriage and procreation, as it helps replenish the 
population.111 Third, the court credited lenity toward heterosexuals 
because it facilitates parental responsibility, as freeing the offender 
from prison would better allow both parents to financially support a 
child should pregnancy result.112 Finally, the court imputed the preven-
tion of STDs as a rational basis, because homosexual sex between males 
is “more generally associated” with a higher risk of STD transmission.113 
In these ways, the court allowed the state to encourage “traditional sex-
ual mores” that could lead to marriage and procreation because it 
“furnish[es] new workers, soldiers, and other useful members of soci-
ety.”114 “The survival of society,” the court reasoned, “requires a con-
tinuous replenishment of its members.”115 The court also reasoned that 
punishing heterosexual sodomy less severely was akin to punishing first-
time offenders of crimes less severely than repeat offenders.116 The 
court explained that statutes punishing people based on classifications, 
such as the sex of the parties, are allowable if the legislature is protect-
ing a class of people, like children.117 
 The Supreme Court of Kansas considered these same interests and 
found that they were not rationally related to the harsh treatment of 
criminal homosexual sodomy.118 In light of Lawrence, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                      
 
109 See id. at 235-37. 
110 Limon I, 83 P.3d at 235-36. 
111 Id. at 237. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 237. The court also reasoned that anal sex between two males could rationally 
be punished more severely than anal sex between an adult and a child of the opposite sex 
because, despite both victims being anally penetrated, sex with a gay male might be more 
hazardous in transmitting diseases such as HIV. See id. at 242 n.2 (Malone, J., concurring). 
114 Id. at 237 (majority opinion). 
115 Limon I, 83 P.3d at 237. 
116 Id. at 240. 
117 See id. at 236. 
118 See Limon II, 122 P.3d at 32, 38. The court summarized the state’s interests in a Ro-
meo and Juliet provision that required the parties to be of the opposite sex as: 
(1) the protection and preservation of the traditional sexual mores of society; 
(2) preservation of the historical notions of appropriate sexual development 
of children; (3) protection of teenagers against coercive relationships; (4) 
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Court of Kansas held insufficient the state’s interest in protecting chil-
dren from homosexual sex because “moral disapproval of a group can-
not be a legitimate governmental interest.”119 Although Lawrence did 
not involve minors, the Supreme Court of Kansas saw no record of sci-
entific evidence that “homosexual sexual activity is more harmful to 
minors than adults.”120 Thus, there was no justification for a harsher 
punishment.121 
 The court relied on an amicus brief from the National Association 
of Social Workers and its Kansas chapter showing that teenagers’ sexual 
experiences do not affect their sexual orientation.122 The court further 
noted that the statute offered reduced penalties for heterosexual sexual 
contact, such as sodomy and lewd contact, that did not actually result in 
pregnancy.123 Finally, the court cited Limon’s argument that the state 
should discourage teen pregnancy, and thus, those relationships lead-
ing to teenage procreation.124 
 The Kansas Appeals Court incorrectly credited the state’s concerns 
about STDs as a rational basis for punishing homosexual sex more 
harshly.125 The Kansas Supreme Court, however, clarified that homo-
sexual teen sex did not pose a greater health concern for spreading 
HIV.126 The court credited statistics provided by the Center for Disease 
Control showing that the majority of HIV positive people between the 
ages thirteen and nineteen—the same ages affected by Romeo and 
Juliet provisions—are female.127 “[T]he gravest risk of sexual transmis-
sion for females,” the Court concluded, “is through heterosexual inter-
course.”128 Moreover, Limon’s criminal sodomy conviction stemmed 
                                                                                                                      
protection of teenagers from the increased health risks that accompany sex-
ual activity; (5) promotion of parental responsibility and procreation; and (6) 
protection of those in group homes. 
Id. at 33–34. Of these arguments, two were not specifically relied upon by the court of ap-
peals—protection from coercive relationships and protection of those in group homes. See 
Limon I, 83 P.3d at 235–37. Regardless, the Supreme Court of Kansas found these argu-
ments unpersuasive. See Limon II, 122 P.3d at 38. 
119 Limon II, 122 P.3d at 35. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
123 See id. at 37. 
124 See Limon II, 122 P.3d at 237. 
125 See id. at 36; Limon I, 83 P.3d at 237. 
126 See Limon II, 122 P.3d at 36–37. 
127 See id. at 36. 
128 Id. at 37. 
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from oral sex which, as the court noted, has a “near-zero chance” of 
transmitting HIV.129 
 Under the court’s rationale, the state must show that such conduct 
poses a greater likelihood of spreading disease than heterosexual sod-
omy.130 The state could not show this, however, and its purported public 
health interest did not rationally support the statute’s harsher treatment 
of homosexual sodomy.131 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Kansas 
held that the statute failed the rational basis test and violated the Equal 
Protection Clauses in both the federal and Kansas constitutions.132 
                                                                                                                     
2. States Without Discriminatory Romeo and Juliet Exceptions 
 Even in states without discriminatory Romeo and Juliet exceptions, 
prosecutors may selectively target queer youth for statutory rape.133 In 
Commonwealth v. Washington W., a thirteen-year-old boy in Massachusetts 
allegedly began having sexual encounters with a fifteen-year-old boy 
named Washington.134 While the alleged encounters continued, Wash-
ington turned sixteen.135 When the younger boy’s father learned of the 
alleged encounters, he reported the situation to the police and they 
charged Washington with two delinquency complaints of statutory rape 
and two delinquency complaints of indecent assault and battery on a 
child under the age of fourteen.136 
 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the 
prosecutor’s “wide discretion” in deciding whether to press charges 
against Washington because a prosecutor’s decision is presumed to be 
in good faith.137 Nonetheless, the SJC also affirmed a limited version of 
 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 36. 
131 See Limon II, 122 P.3d at 36. 
132 See id. at 38. 
133 See Levine, supra note 15, at 694–95, 739 n.176; Sutherland, supra note 2, at 327–28; 
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908, 910 (Mass. 2010) (seeking dis-
covery to prove selective statutory rape prosecution based on sexual orientation). 
134 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 910. The court noted that the boys had been diag-
nosed with Asperger’s Syndrome but did not elaborate how this factored into the court’s 
decision. See id. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. Statutory rape of a child under the age of fourteen is punishable by impris-
onment for up to ten years in Massachusetts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 13B (2011). 
The court noted that, though the prosecution argued that Washington forcibly raped the 
complainant, for some unstated reason Washington did not face charges for rape by force. 
See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 910 n.1. 
137 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 911 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 
N.E.2d 834, 842 (Mass. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the discovery order granted to Washington by the juvenile court to pur-
sue his selective prosecution claim.138 The Court reasoned that “the 
subtleties behind a decision to prosecute just one youth in the context 
of same-gender sexual relations suggests that a comparison of similarly 
situated juvenile defendants . . . may provide more telling and relevant 
statistical information to support the juvenile’s claim.”139 According to 
the court, Washington needed discovery because the prosecution pos-
sessed all revealing data.140 
a. Parental Prosecution 
 Prosecutors may also selectively pursue queer youth because, as in 
Washington W., parents urge them to do so.141 This parental push could 
lead to selective prosecution based on a queer youth’s failure to fit so-
cial norms.142 The SJC in Washington W. noted that the younger boy in-
volved had “indicated that homosexuality was wrong and that he was 
not a homosexual, and his parents initiated the criminal complaint.”143 
In its relatively short opinion, the court mentioned three times that the 
younger boy’s parents were involved in the decision to prosecute, high-
lighting the way that parental reactions factor into a prosecutor’s deci-
sion-making.144 
 Parents often have pronounced reactions when they discover that 
their child has engaged in same-sex sexual activity.145 For example, 
Beatrice Dorn, legal director of the Lambda Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, says statutory rape cases where the de-
fendant is barely older than the victim are more likely to be 
prosecuted if the partners are of the same sex. ‘It happens be-
                                                                                                                      
138 See id. at 911, 914. The court granted Washington a limited discovery order so that 
he could potentially make the required threshold showing of relevance and thereby argue 
for a more expansive discovery order. See id. at 915. 
139 Id. at 914. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 914; Sutherland, supra note 2, at 322, 327–28. 
142 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 1–3; Chang & Davis, supra note 25, at 15 n.30 (cit-
ing Berlant & Warner, supra note 25 at 548 n.2); Levine, supra note 15, at 694–95, 739 
n.176; Sutherland, supra note 2, at 314, 322; Wardenski, supra note 15, at 1367–68, 1374–
75. 
143 Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 914. 
144 See id. at 910, 910 n.2, 914; see also Sutherland, supra note 2, at 322, 327–28. 
145 See Sutherland, supra note 2, at 327–28; cf. José Gabilondo, Irrational Exuberance 
About Babies: The Taste for Heterosexuality and its Conspicuous Reproduction, 28 B.C. Third 
World L.J. 1, 11 (2008) (discussing parental preference for heterosexual offspring). 
2012] Prosecutorial Decision-Making: Queer Youth and Statutory Rape 439 
cause parents go nutso when they find out their kid has been 
having gay sex.’146 
Age of consent violations are more likely to be filed when the actors are 
of the same sex.147 Washington embraced this notion and argued that it 
would “likely show that underage mutually agreed-to heterosexual ac-
tions amongst similarly aged teenagers are not prosecuted, but that 
homosexual acts are prosecuted, especially when the parents of one of 
the parties insist.”148 
b. The Ripple Effect 
 Queer youth are also more likely to be punished by school officials 
and local law enforcement officers, and this can have a detrimental 
ripple effect.149 According to a 2010 study conducted by the American 
Academy of Pediatrics, “[n]onheterosexuality consistently predicted a 
higher risk for sanctions” such as being expelled from school, being 
stopped by police, being arrested, and being convicted of crimes.150 
This is especially true regarding sex-based offenses.151 A 2009 study by 
Legal Services for Children, the National Juvenile Defender Center, 
and the National Center for Lesbian Rights found that despite opinions 
by medical and mental health professionals to the contrary, some juve-
nile justice professionals still consider LGBT people as mentally ill and 
sexually deviant.152 As a result, police often selectively target LGBT 
youth and disproportionately charge them with sex offenses while over-
looking similar crimes involving heterosexual offenders.153 Moreover, 
the American Academy of Pediatrics study concluded that these “dis-
proportionate educational and criminal-justice punishments . . . are not 
explained by greater engagement in illegal or transgressive behav-
iors.”154 Instead, some researchers conclude that the disproportionately 
                                                                                                                      
146 Donna Minkowitz, On Trial: Gay? Straight? Boy? Girl? Sex? Rape?, Out, Oct. 1995, at 
99, 145. 
147 Sutherland, supra note 2, at 327–28. Teens may also experience maltreatment in 
their own homes, such as verbal and physical abuse due to parental rejection of their sexu-
ality. Higdon, supra note 4, at 216–17. 
148 Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 914. 
149 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 3, 77–78; Kathryn E. W. Himmelstein & Hannah 
Brückner, Criminal-Justice and School Sanctions Against Nonheterosexual Youth: A National Lon-
gitudinal Study, 127 Pediatrics 49, 54 (2011). 
150 Himmelstein & Brückner, supra note 149, at 49. 
151 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
152 See id. at iv, 3. 
153 See id. at 3. 
154 Himmelstein & Brückner, supra note 149, at 49. 
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punitive treatment that queer youth experience is a product of the ju-
venile justice system’s “profound lack of acceptance of LGBT iden-
tity.”155 This lack of acceptance is “[r]ooted in a lack of understanding 
of—and sometimes outright bias against—LGBT youth . . . .”156 
 Though queer youth’s disproportionately higher rate of punish-
ment is attributable in part to the biases and ignorance of adult offi-
cials, it is also a likely consequence of being rejected by peers.157 The 
majority of queer youth are harassed by their peers, which can lead to 
an increased risk of formal punishment both in school and in the juve-
nile justice system.158 According to a 2009 report by the Gay, Lesbian 
and Straight Education Network, almost eighty-five percent of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender middle and high school students re-
ported being verbally harassed in school because of their sexual orien-
tation, and over forty percent reported physical harassment.159 Peer 
harassment has led to lowered grade point averages, increased dropout 
rates, and “a heightened risk for juvenile court involvement” for queer 
youth.160 
 Harassment has also contributed significantly to arrest and formal 
truancy charges, as queer youth may skip school out of concern for 
their personal safety.161 “In one study, 32.7 percent of LGBT students 
reported that they had missed school in the past month because they 
felt unsafe, compared to 4.5 percent of a national sample . . . .”162 
When such harassment occurs, police and school officials may pre-
sumptively blame the bullied queer student.163 In one case, school offi-
cials told a bullied queer that, because he wore nail polish, he was “so 
provocative that the kids couldn’t help but pick on him . . . .”164 When 
queer youth are truant from school to avoid this type of harassment, 
                                                                                                                      
155 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 2. 
156 Id. 
157 See id. at 76–78. 
158 See Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network, The 2009 National School 
Climate Survey Executive Summary 3 (2009), available at http://www.glsen.org/ binary- 
data/GLSEN_ATTACHMENTS/file/000/001/1676-2.PDF [hereinafter GLSEN]; Majd et 
al., supra note 1, at 76–78. 
159 See GLSEN, supra note 158, at 3. The survey sample consisted of a total of 7261 stu-
dents between the ages of thirteen and twenty-one. Id. at i. Students surveyed were from all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia. Id. 
160 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 76. 
161 See id. 
162 Id. 
163 See id. at 76–77. 
164 Id. at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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they may experience a detrimental effect because truancy counts 
against children in juvenile proceedings.165 
                                                                                                                     
c. Social Rejection 
 Queer youth are also socially rejected in other ways.166 For exam-
ple, in McMillen v. Itawamba County School District, a Mississippi school’s 
“opposite sex” prom date policy barred Constance McMillen from 
bringing her girlfriend to prom as a date.167 Itawamba Agricultural 
High School’s assistant principal informed McMillen that she could not 
bring her girlfriend to prom unless they each brought male dates.168 
Even if the girls brought male dates, the school district superintendent 
required that they wear dresses, forbade them from slow dancing to-
gether, and said they would be asked to leave if they made anyone un-
comfortable.169 McMillen sought help from the American Civil Liber-
ties Union in suing the school district, and the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Mississippi ruled that the school’s actions vio-
lated McMillen’s First Amendment right of free expression.170 
 Instead of respecting the District court’s decision and allowing 
McMillen and her girlfriend to attend, the school invited McMillen to a 
fake prom attended only by seven other students.171 Unbeknownst to 
her, the rest of the students attended a different, secret prom.172 Be-
cause the status quo for queer youth creates harassment by peers, a 
higher risk of formal punishment, and persistent community rejection, 
queer youth are in a precarious position.173 Despite the court’s ruling 
amid public scrutiny, school officials and parents persisted in excluding 
 
165 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 78. 
166 See, e.g., McMillen v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705 (N.D. Miss. 
2010) (holding that a school’s actions based upon a student’s sexual orientation infringed on 
her First Amendment rights, creating a substantial risk that her right to free expression 
would be “irreparably harm[ed]”); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU 
Complaint Takes on “Decoy” Prom for Mississippi Lesbian Student (Apr. 21, 2010), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/aclu-complaint-takes-decoy-prom-mississippi-lesbian-stu 
dent [hereinafter ACLU Decoy Prom]. 
167 See McMillen, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 701. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 701, 705. 
171 See ACLU Decoy Prom, supra note 166. 
172 See id. 
173 See Limon II, 122 P.3d at 25; Limon, 83 P.3d at 237; McMillen, 702 F.Supp.2d at 705; 
GLSEN: supra note 158, at 3; Majd et al., supra note 1, at 1–3, 75–78; Himmelstein & 
Brückner, supra note 149, at 49; ACLU Decoy Prom, supra note 166. 
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McMillen to her legal detriment because of her sexual orientation.174 
Just as the Court of Appeals of Kansas resisted change, school officials 
and parents clung to the status quo despite arguable legal directives to 
the contrary.175 
 Queer youth’s precarious position is compounded by the instabil-
ity that results from being rejected by family—an experience familiar to 
a substantial percentage of queer youth.176 “One study found that 45 
percent of parents were angry, sick, or disgusted when first learning of 
their child’s sexual orientation or gender identity,” and another found 
that “approximately 30 percent of LGBT youth were physically abused 
by family members as a result . . . .”177 When their families react nega-
tively, queer youth are more prone to engage in criminal activities, es-
pecially crimes of necessity like shoplifting and prostitution.178 More-
                                                                                                                      
174 See ACLU Decoy Prom, supra note 166; Ian Thompson, Ms. McMillen Goes to Wash-
ington!, ACLU Blog of Rights ( June 23, 2010, 5:40 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-
rights/ms-mcmillen-goes-washington (noting that McMillen made headlines and that this 
controversy eventually brought her to the White House, where President Obama lauded 
her courage). 
175 See Limon I, 83 P.3d at 238 (finding rational basis for different punishment of criminal 
homosexual sodomy than for criminal heterosexual sodomy despite the case being re-
manded from the U.S. Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Lawrence). Compare 
McMillen, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (holding that a school violated a lesbian student’s First 
Amendment right of free expression because of its discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion), with ACLU Decoy Prom, supra note 166 (reporting the school’s defiant exclusion of 
McMillen despite a court ruling that the school district violated McMillen’s constitutional 
rights). The school ultimately settled with McMillen after the ACLU filed an amended com-
plaint that included the “decoy” prom. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, 
Mississippi School Agrees to Revise Policy and Pay Damages to Lesbian Teenager Denied 
Chance to Attend Prom ( July 20, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/missi- 
ssippi-school-agrees-revise-policy-and-pay-damages-lesbian-teenager-denied-chance-a. 
176 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 3, 70, 74. Beyond direct legal peril, when queer 
youth are rejected by their families, friends, and peers, they have a greater risk of health 
problems. See Tumaini R. Coker et al., The Health and Health Care of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisex-
ual Adolescents, 31 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 457, 458, 468 (2010). A 2009 study found that 
queer youth who were “highly rejected” by their families were eight times more likely to 
attempt suicide, six times more “likely to report high levels of depression,” and three times 
more likely to use illegal drugs and be at “high risk” for STDs such as HIV. See Ryan, supra 
note 83, at 5. Finally, as Professor Levine explains, “the emphasis on family support and 
premarriage type commitments leaves no room for gay relationships, which often lack the 
support of the teen’s family and cannot lead to marriage,” thus resulting in a denial of the 
same “intimacy discount” or prosecutorial forbearance that heterosexual youth may re-
ceive. Levine, supra note 15, at 694–695, 739 n.176. 
177 See Majd et al., supra note 1, at 70. 
178 See id. at 3, 72. “Research shows that leaving home as a result of family rejection is the 
greatest predictor of future involvement with the juvenile justice system for LGBT youth. In a 
study of LGBT homeless youth, 39 percent reported they had been ‘kicked out’ of their 
home because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and 45 percent reported in-
volvement with the juvenile justice system.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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over, queer children with unsupportive families generally do not fare as 
well in the legal system.179 
III. Challenges to Showing Selective Prosecution in Same-Sex 
Juvenile Statutory Rape Cases 
 Even though queer youth are more vulnerable in their communi-
ties and punished disproportionately, proving their selective prosecution 
in statutory rape cases poses several challenges.180 Queer youth must 
show that they are disfavored enough to merit protection, show prosecu-
torial bias, and surmount the prosecutor’s near-absolute discretion.181 
A. Showing Prosecutorial Bias 
 Before receiving a discovery order, a defendant must make a 
threshold showing of selective prosecution.182 State courts may differ 
on what meets the threshold, but generally, the defendant must show 
prosecution based on “‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, 
or other arbitrary classification.’”183 Making this showing may be diffi-
cult when sexual orientation is not a suspect class requiring heightened 
scrutiny.184 Courts would likely use the lowest standard of review, the 
                                                                                                                      
 
179 See id. at 3, 74. 
180 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1996) (discussing the “back-
ground presumption . . . that the showing necessary to obtain discovery should itself be a 
significant barrier”); Sapir, supra note 20, at 141–42 (arguing that racist prosecutors could 
conceal their biases making showing selective prosecution based on race an “insurmount-
able obstacle”); Heller, supra note 20, at 1322–23 (arguing that the significant barrier 
erected by Armstrong “has effectively mooted an important constitutional protection”). 
181 See Poulin, supra note 30, at 1076 (explaining that the defendant must show “that 
similarly situated offenders who are not members of the disfavored group have not been 
prosecuted”); Sapir, supra note 20, at 141–42, 173; Stein, supra note 25, at 482 (“The few 
courts that have held that sexual orientation classifications warrant heightened scrutiny 
have had their decisions overruled or vacated.”); Yoshino, supra note 25, at 756 (explain-
ing that sexual orientation is reviewed under a lower, rational basis standard unlike classifi-
cations such as race); see, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; Commonwealth v. Washington W., 
928 N.E.2d 908, 912 n.4 (Mass. 2010) (declining to consider whether sexual orientation is 
a protected class in Massachusetts). 
182 See, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (requiring a threshold showing of credible evi-
dence showing that similarly situated persons were not prosecuted); Washington W., 928 
N.E.2d at 915 (affirming discovery order to allow Washington to make a threshold show-
ing). 
183 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 911–12 (quoting Commonwealth v. King, 372 
N.E.2d 196, 206 (Mass. 1977)). 
184 See id. at 912 n.4 (declining to consider whether sexual orientation is a class suspect 
enough to warrant protection, but noting that selective prosecution could be found under 
the lower rational basis standard); Higdon, supra note 4, at 231–34 (explaining some gra-
dations of standards of review as applied by the courts); Stein, supra note 25, at 482; Yo-
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rational basis test, to evaluate queer youths’ claims of selective prosecu-
tion.185 As exemplified by the Court of Appeals of Kansas in Limon, 
such a standard is highly deferential to the state.186 
                                                                                                                     
 Any defendant arguing selective prosecution faces the “significant 
barrier” erected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Armstrong.187 
In Armstrong, the Court explained that selective prosecution claims are 
rooted in constitutional equal protection standards.188 To prove selec-
tive prosecution, and thus an equal protection violation, a defendant 
must show (1) the prosecution’s discriminatory effect and (2) its moti-
vation by a discriminatory purpose; in other words, the prosecutor must 
specifically intend to discriminate.189 
 A queer defendant likely faces similar obstacles to revealing a 
prosecutor’s buried bias as those faced by defendants arguing racially-
motivated selective prosecution.190 Prosecutors with racial biases are 
unlikely to admit them openly.191 Yoav Sapir explains this phenomenon, 
stating that “it is very hard to find someone who will admit that she is 
racist, or who will openly say, ‘I think black people are criminals.’”192 
Similarly, prosecutors biased against queers are unlikely to publicly an-
 
shino, supra note 25, at 756. Rational basis review is a standard that is highly deferential to 
the government and “[a]lmost any justification is enough to establish rationality.” Stein, 
supra note 25, at 483–84. When evaluating laws that classify and what level of review they 
receive, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered, among other factors, whether “the classi-
fication has historically been used to intentionally discriminate against a particular group 
. . . .” Id. at 482 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)). In 2011, the De-
partment of Justice declared that sexual orientation merits “a more heightened standard 
of scrutiny” due to “a number of factors, including a documented history of discrimination 
. . . .” Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on Litiga-
tion Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (February 23, 2011), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html. Nonetheless, courts have not declared 
the same. See Yoshino, supra note 25, at 756. 
185 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 912 n.4; Sapir, supra note 20, at 159–60; Yoshino, 
supra note 25, at 756. 
186 See Limon I, 83 P.3d at 233–34, 240 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004); Stein, supra note 25, at 
483–84. 
187 517 U.S. at 464; see Sapir, supra note 20, at 141–42; Heller, supra note 20, at 1322–23. 
188 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465. 
189 See id. at 476. A state constitutional claim may also be impeded by Armstrong because 
state courts may look to the federal standard when interpreting their own constitutions. 
See, e.g., Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 143. 
190 See Stacey M. Brumbaugh et al., Attitudes Toward Gay Marriage in States Undergoing 
Marriage Law Transformation, 70 J. Marriage & Fam. 345, 356 (2008); Chang & Davis, supra 
note 25, at 15 n.30 (citing Berlant & Warner, supra note 25, at 548 n.2); Higdon, supra note 
4, at 214; Sapir, supra note 20, at 141–42. 
191 See Sapir, supra note 20, at 141. 
192 Id. 
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nounce their feelings.193 Although Sapir argues that disparaging re-
marks about gay people are more socially acceptable than racism, prose-
cutors would probably not risk being branded as biased.194 This diffi-
culty, combined with the judicial deference to a prosecutor’s discretion, 
makes proving discriminatory intent exceptionally challenging.195 
B. Near-Absolute Prosecutorial Discretion 
 A defendant arguing selective prosecution must also confront the 
reality that deference to prosecutorial discretion is near-absolute.196 
This practically unchecked power is vulnerable to abuse motivated by a 
prosecutor’s personal biases.197 As explained in Armstrong, courts pre-
sume that prosecutorial decisions are proper unless there is “clear evi-
dence to the contrary.”198 Such unfettered discretion led Robert H. 
Jackson, former U.S. Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice, to 
comment that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and 
reputation than any other person in America.”199 
 Despite potential for abuse—or, at a minimum, for questionable 
choices that greatly affect citizens’ lives—the prosecutor retains discre-
tion because the benefits arguably outweigh the potential harm.200 
Those benefits are: “(1) promoting prosecutorial and judicial economy 
and avoiding delay; (2) preventing the chilling of law enforcement; (3) 
avoiding the undermining of prosecutorial effectiveness; and (4) ad-
hering to the constitutional principle of separation of powers . . . .”201 
Protecting prosecutorial discretion furthers prosecutorial economy by 
                                                                                                                      
193 See id. 
194 See id. at 141–42, 173. Sapir argues that because racist and misogynistic views are 
less acceptable today, they are more hidden and sometimes remain unconscious. See id. at 
173 (explaining, for example, that a black person carrying a weapon could be seen as dif-
ferent, more serious, or more dangerous than an armed white person). Biased prosecu-
tors, however, may suppress anti-queer sentiments more as same-sex relationships are be-
coming increasingly legitimate in the law. See Brumbaugh et al., supra note 190, at 345 
(reporting on the conflict between perceived social values and civil rights). Moreover, an 
unconscious bias similar to that of racism and sexism arguably exists for queer Americans 
in a heteronormative society. See Chang & Davis, supra note 25, at 15 n.30 (citing Berlant & 
Warner, supra note 25, at 548 n.2); Higdon, supra note 4, at 214. 
195 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; Heller, supra note 20, at 1322–23; Sapir, supra note 
20, at 141–42. 
196 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464–65; Heller, supra note 20, at 1325–26. 
197 See Robert H. Jackson, 24 J. Am. Judicature Soc’y 18, 18–19 (1940); Heller, supra 
note 20, at 1325–26. 
198 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464–65 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199 Jackson, supra note 197, at 18; see Heller, supra note 20, at 1325. 
200 See Heller, supra note 20, at 1328. 
201 Id. at 1326. 
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preventing frivolous lawsuits and the need to respond to time-
consuming discovery requests.202 Also, this policy decreases the number 
of prosecutorial discretion cases, thereby furthering judicial economy 
and avoiding delays.203 Limiting prosecutorial discretion claims stops 
the chilling of law enforcement too, thereby allowing decisive law en-
forcement.204 This avoids undermining law enforcement by keeping 
strategies confidential and free from controversy.205 Finally, separation 
of powers is maintained by not encroaching on the province of execu-
tive-appointed officials who are in a better position than courts to make 
effective prosecutorial decisions.206 
C. Challenges Unique to Juveniles 
 A challenge unique to juveniles arguing selective prosecution is the 
confidentiality of sensitive juvenile records, as seen in Commonwealth v. 
Washington W..207 The standard for showing selective prosecution under 
the Massachusetts Constitution is parallel to the federal standard, as ar-
ticulated in Armstrong.208 A defendant making a claim under the Massa-
chusetts Constitution must make a threshold showing of relevance.209 As 
the court in Washington W. pointed out, however, a juvenile defendant is 
at a disadvantage because, unlike an adult, this threshold is not satisfied 
by searching court records for evidence and comparing the number of 
complaints, indictments, and prosecutions.210 The juvenile defendant’s 
disadvantage is thus unique because he or she cannot comparatively 
demonstrate how similarly situated individuals are treated.211 
 Access to juvenile court proceedings and records varies by state, 
but it is often disallowed when children are accused of certain crimes, 
and especially when they are victims of abuse.212 Limiting public access, 
                                                                                                                      
 
202 See id. at 1328. 
203 See id. 
204 See id. at 1331. 
205 See Heller, supra note 20, at 1333–34. 
206 See id. at 1338–39. 
207 See Bazelon, supra note 22, at 155; Horne, supra note 22, at 659; see, e.g., Washington 
W., 928 N.E.2d at 912 (noting that no public records were available for Washington to 
show he was treated differently by the prosecutor and that there were strong policy reasons 
for maintaining confidentiality). 
208 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463–65; Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 911–13. 
209 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 913. 
210 See id. at 912–13. 
211 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463–65; Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 913; Bazelon, supra 
note 22, at 155; Horne, supra note 22, at 659. 
212 See Bazelon, supra note 22, at 155; Horne, supra note 22, at 659; Charles R. Petrof, 
Note, Protecting the Anonymity of Child Sexual Assault Victims, 40 Wayne L. Rev. 1677, 1686–87 
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especially to court proceedings, when children are victims of abuse may 
help victims recover without undue public attention and could encour-
age future victims to report abuse.213 Some consider this shielding of 
the minor victim to be important to recovery because sexual assault, 
specifically rape, is psychologically traumatic and societal reactions may 
exacerbate the harm.214 Furthermore, public attention may negatively 
affect the ability of the child’s family to cope with the abuse and, con-
sequently, hinder the child’s healing.215 Safety concerns also prompt a 
closed record because publicity could lead to further abuse or retalia-
tion from the abuser.216 
 The court in Washington W. also noted a characteristic unique to 
selective prosecution claims when the parties to a statutory rape case 
are of the same sex.217 First, gender equality cannot be achieved—and 
prosecutorial biases neutralized—by simply charging all parties with 
statutory rape.218 For example, the heterosexual statutory rape case of 
Commonwealth v. Bernardo B. dealt with a male minor charged with statu-
tory rape of three female minor friends.219 Bernardo, a fourteen-year-
old boy, allegedly engaged in manual and oral sex with three girls, two 
of whom were twelve and one of whom was about to turn twelve.220 The 
court found that he used no force and that all parties under the age of 
consent mutually “assented-to” the sexual activity, but only Bernardo 
faced statutory rape charges.221 The district attorney did not dispute 
the encounters’ “consensual” nature but refused Bernardo’s request to 
also charge the girls with statutory rape.222 Bernardo therefore argued 
that he was selectively prosecuted based on his gender.223 In Bernardo 
B., the prosecutor’s decision relied on gender norms, but in Washington 
                                                                                                                      
(1994). Statutes that restrict access to juvenile court records, as seen in Washington, may none-
theless allow a judge to order discovery. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 60A (2011) (not-
ing that certain juvenile records are closed “except with the consent of a justice of such 
court”). 
213 See Petrof, supra note 212, at 1686–87. 
214 See id. at 1688–89. For instance, victims of sexual assault may not only be embar-
rassed if their peers learn of the incident, they may be ostracized. See id. 
215 See id. at 1689–90. 
216 See id. at 1690. 
217 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 914. 
218 See id. 
219 See 900 N.E.2d 834, 837 (Mass. 2009). 
220 Id. at 837, 839–40. Bernardo received both oral and “manual” sex, often colloqui-
ally described as a “hand job.” Id. at 838 n.7, 840. 
221 See id. at 838–40, 844, 846. 
222 See id. at 844. 
223 See id. 
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W., similarly charging all parties would not prevent “the danger of se-
lective prosecution” based on sexual orientation.224 
                                                                                                                     
IV. More Discovery, Please: Why the Court in Washington W.  
Got It Right 
 The court in Commonwealth v. Washington W. reasoned that, “in light 
of the constraints imposed by the Juvenile Court, [Washington’s] claim 
[was] sufficiently serious to warrant further inquiry.”225 The court there-
fore affirmed the limited discovery order, allowing Washington to make 
the threshold showing necessary for further discovery toward proving 
selective prosecution.226 The court credited the experience of two 
judges in juvenile court who initially issued the discovery orders and 
concluded that “discovery would not be burdensome for the Common-
wealth.”227 Although the SJC limited the scope of the order, the court 
affirmed it without considering whether sexual orientation is a pro-
tected class in Massachusetts.228 Although “selective prosecution must be 
based on discriminatory treatment of someone who is a member of a 
protected class,” the SJC granted discovery because Washington could 
possibly demonstrate violation of his constitutional rights under rational 
basis review.229 The court noted that the Commonwealth actually em-
phasized, “the historic continuing animosity against homosexual[s,]” 
and that equal protection violations are important because “the desire 
to effectuate one’s animus against homosexuals can never be a legiti-
 
224 See Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 914 (construing Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834). 
225 928 N.E.2d 908, 914 (Mass. 2010). 
226 See id. at 913–14. Washington originally sought discovery including such things as 
the number of cases both reported and charged in the last five years for “statutory rape 
and/or indecent assault and battery where the accused and the complaining witness were 
under 17 years old, including the age and sex of the accused and the complaining wit-
ness,” and similarly for “sexual assaults of a person—including but not limited to Rape, 
Rape of a Child, Statutory Rape, Assault with Intent to Commit Rape, and Indecent Assault 
and Battery—including the sex of the accused and the sex of the complaining witness.” Id. 
at 913. Washington also sought “[a]ny and all written policies by the Norfolk County Dis-
trict Attorney in effect during the last five years concerning the charging of statutory rape” 
and “[a]ny statistical compilations, reports or studies done by the Norfolk District Attor-
ney's Office concerning sex crimes or sex cases in Norfolk County in the last five years.” Id. 
The SJC ruled that the juvenile court judges did not abuse their discretion in granting the 
orders but limited the order to “cases where statutory rape, indecent assault and battery, 
or both, were charged and the juvenile and the complainant were both under the age of 
seventeen years.” Id. at 915. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. at 912 n.4, 915. 
229 See id. at 912 n.4. 
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mate governmental purpose.”230 As there was a path for Washington to 
pursue his claim, the court held that the discovery order was war-
ranted.231 
 Regardless of Washington’s ultimate success, the preliminary dis-
covery order reveals a potentially problematic breed of selective prose-
cution and may result in equitable change.232 Professor Anne Poulin 
explains that “airing [a] defendant’s claim in the legal process may have 
a more subtle beneficial influence on the future exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion.”233 Such “soft enforcement” influences the system from 
within because complying with discovery orders spurs self-regulation 
and therefore ensures proper future prosecutorial decisions.234 Soft en-
forcement can also contribute to public understanding of prosecutorial 
decision-making, result in heightened public scrutiny, and create “a 
demand for more careful exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”235 Al-
though concerns exist over the chilling of law enforcement, critics 
maintain that prosecutors are too powerful and that giving them unfet-
tered discretion leaves some people more vulnerable.236 Soft enforce-
ment is a less intrusive means for equitable change because it encour-
ages “self-scrutiny,” which may effectively “sensitize” the law enforce-
ment community to systemic and individual biases.237 The juvenile 
justice system must improve sensitivity to sexual orientation and address 
biases because “LGBT youth continue to face harmful discrimination in 
their homes, schools, and communities . . . . [and] juvenile justice pro-
                                                                                                                      
230 Washington W., 928 N.E.2d at 912 n.4, 914 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
231 See id. at 912 n.4, 914. 
232 See Poulin, supra note 30, at 1090–92. 
233 Id. at 1091. 
234 See id. at 1090. 
235 Id. at 1090. 
236 See id. at 1090–91; Sapir, supra note 20, at 138–40. Sapir notes that 
James Vorenberg raised the concern that broad and almost unchecked discre-
tion of prosecutors will result in a situation in which “society’s most funda-
mental sanctions will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously and that the 
least favored members of the community—racial and ethnic minorities, social 
outcasts, [and] the poor—will be treated most harshly.” 
Sapir, supra note 20, at 138–39 (quoting James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial 
Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521, 1555 (1981)). Sapir also argues that “[i]n contrast to the 
legislation process, individuals often make prosecutorial decisions. Presuming that the 
majority of the population is not racist, the probability that a single prosecutor will be rac-
ist is higher than the probability that there will be a racist majority among a group of legis-
lators.” Id. at 139. 
237 Poulin, supra note 30, at 1091–92. 
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fessionals remain unprepared to effectively serve [and] . . . treat them 
fairly.”238 
 Despite concerns about opening juvenile court records regarding 
sex and abuse, a court can consider and balance the interests involved 
to tailor a discovery order without granting unfettered access.239 Courts 
may maintain the integrity of public policy concerns behind closed ju-
venile court records by giving defendants private access only to court 
records and not the actual proceedings.240 Balancing interests and tai-
loring access can also ensure that the discovery does not burden the 
state.241 
 Furthermore, queer youth and their communities could benefit 
from the publicity surrounding cases claiming selective prosecution 
based on sexual orientation.242 “[C]ourts are public places where soci-
ety’s values, ideas, and concerns are continually tested,” and allowing 
the public to hear more stories involving queer youth in these ways 
could spur helpful public discussion.243 Such discourse could contrib-
ute to increased soft enforcement, ultimately acting as a check on 
prosecutorial discretion and resulting in equitable change.244 
 Given the hurdles inherent in selective prosecution claims, discov-
ery orders like the one issued in Washington W. could be a pragmatic 
way to achieve equitable improvements in the juvenile justice system.245 
Queer youth experience disparately higher amounts of formal sanc-
tion, especially for sex-based crimes, and the juvenile justice system in-
adequately responds to their needs.246 Therefore, queer youth should 
not shy from difficult selective prosecution claims.247 Even if such 
claims are ultimately unsuccessful, merely bringing the claim may im-
prove the juvenile justice system through soft enforcement, and “[t]he 
key to soft enforcement is often discovery.”248 
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Conclusion 
 Statutory rape laws vary by state, but a prosecutor’s broad discre-
tion is constant. As studies reveal, queer youth are quite vulnerable in 
their communities, and they are more likely to be formally punished. 
Despite the seemingly insurmountable barriers to claiming selective 
prosecution, especially for queer youth, defendants in these situations 
should still challenge the status quo. Even if queer youth are selectively 
prosecuted and are unsuccessful in their claims, they may nonetheless 
improve their communities by telling their stories. 
 
similarly situated juveniles is within the possession of the district attorney's office, and the 
juvenile has no ability to access that information absent a court order.”). 
